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Normative systems in a multiagent system must be able to evolve
over time, for example due to actions creating or removing norms
in the system. The only formal framework to evaluate and classify
normative system change methods is the so-called AGM frame-
work of theory change, which has originally been developed as a
framework to describe and classify both belief and normative sys-
tem change. However, it has been used for belief change only, since
the beliefs or norms are represented as propositional formulas. We
therefore propose, as a normative framework for normative system
change, to replace propositional formulas in the AGM framework
of theory change by pairs of propositional formulas, representing
the rule based character of norms, and to add several principles
from the input/output logic framework. In this new framework, we
show that some of the AGM properties cannot be expressed, and
other properties are consistent only for some logics, but not for
others.
Categories and Subject Descriptors




Normative systems, norm change, input/output logic, belief revi-
sion
1. INTRODUCTION
The focus of this paper is the social/organizational structure of a
multiagent system, and in particular norms and normative behavior.
The consensus deﬁnition of the ﬁrst workshop on normative mul-
tiagent systems in 2005 is that “Normative MultiAgent Systems
are multiagent systems with normative systems in which agents
can decide whether to follow the explicitly represented norms, and
the normative systems specify how and in which extent the agents
can modify the norms” [5]. In this deﬁnition, the explicit repre-
sentation of norms and the possibility to violate norms were di-
rectly borrowed from the deontic logic in computer science tra-
dition, and therefore uncontroversial. What was new in this def-
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inition is the common agreement in the community that norma-
tive systems specify how and to which extent the agents can mod-
ify the norms. It is therefore known as “the normchange deﬁni-
tion" of normative multiagent systems. The central problem of
changing norms lead to a workshop on norm change in 2007 [10],
which highlighted that there are many distinct and complicated ap-
proaches, without a common framework or consensus on how to
change norms. The only formal framework to evaluate and classify
normative system change methods is the so-called AGM frame-
work of theory change [2], which has originally been developed as
a framework to describe and classify both belief and normative sys-
tem change. AGM theory studies how a set of propositions should
change in view of a possibly new conﬂicting information, by pro-
viding a set of postulates that the new belief or norm set should
satisfy. Typically there are several sets that satisfy the conditions
and no solution about which one to chose is provided. AGM the-
ory respects a number of postulates which are useful in the setting
of norm change, like success, the retracted proposition should not
be obligatory anymore, or minimality. However, it has been used
for belief change only, since the beliefs or norms are represented as
propositional formulas. This leads to our central research question:
How should we evaluate and classify norm change meth-
ods?
This breaks down into the following questions:
1. Which abstract model of normative system change?
2. How to classify norm contraction methods?
3. How to classify norm revision methods?
The description level of this paper is methodologies and lan-
guages. In our abstract model, we start from AGM theory of belief
revision. However, we represent norms as pairs of propositional
formulas, which are interpreted as rules that can be applied to a
context to lead to a set of obligations. In our norm change ap-
proach we adopt principles from the input/output logic framework.
As examples of normative systems, we consider three input/output
logics. The properties for norm change are derived from properties
of belief change like success, recovery, and so on.
The inspiration source of our work is from law, social sciences
and philosophy. In law, norms represent the legal code, and change
due to actions of legislators. In sociology, norms describe expecta-
tions about interactions among agents, and change due to changes
in expectations. In philosophy and ethics, norms are studied in de-
ontic logic.
The layout of this paper follows the research questions of this pa-
per and is as follows. In Section 2 we introduce our abstract model
of normative system change, in Section 3 we discuss contraction,
and in Section 4 we consider the revision of normative systems.
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2. ABSTRACT MODEL NORM CHANGE
2.1 Norm change in multiagent systems
If the agents have an explicit representation of norms, and the
normative system is endowed with mechanisms to change norms,
then the multiagent system becomes more ﬂexible and it can adapt
itself to changes in the environment or in the goals of agents.
There are various kinds of norm modiﬁcation in legal theories.
The most common case is when the legal system is revised by intro-
ducing new norms that are incompatible with existing ones. A na-
tional law can derogate a regional law in a more restricted context,
since obligations and permissions work as exceptions to previous
norms, as, for example, we study in [4].
Besides this implicit modiﬁcation mechanism, legal systems have
explicit modiﬁcations. In this case, the law introduces norms whose
peculiar objective is to change the system by specifying what and
how other existing norms should be modiﬁed. Governatori and Ro-
tolo [8] study such mechanisms, where norms can be annulled,
eliminating also their effects in the past, abrogated, leaving their
effects in the past hold, their temporal extension changed, etc.
Both implicit and explicit modiﬁcations may lead to more and
more complex normative systems. Thus, in legal or normative mul-
tiagent systems, it is necessary at some point to redesign the sys-
tem, for example by removing redundant norms. The problem of
deﬁning when a norm is redundant has been studied in [6].
2.2 Abstract model of normative system
In this paper we start from a general deﬁnition of an input/output
logic framework introduced by Makinson and van der Torre [11],
by discussing several of their principles.
The ﬁrst input/output logic principle we adopt in this paper is
that norms are not represented by propositional sentences, as in
AGM framework for theory change [2], or as modal formulas, as
in deontic logic, but as pairs of formulas of an arbitrary logic. In
this paper, following most of the work on input/output logic, we
use propositional logic for this arbitrary logic, and norms are thus
represented by pairs of propositional formulas. The results in this
paper hold also if we use a ﬁrst-order, temporal or action logic, but
the use of propositional logic makes the formal exposition simpler,
and makes it also straightforward to relate our study to the AGM
framework of theory change. In contrast to [11], we assume that
the set of propositional atoms is ﬁnite, such that for each set of
propositional formulas, there is a single propositional formula that
is equivalent to it. The pair of propositional formulas represents a
rule, and the two propositional formulas are called the antecedent
and consequent of the rule. We restrict ourselves to the class of
regulative norms that are used to generate obligations and prohibi-
tions.
DEFINITION 1 (NORMS AS RULES [11]). Let L be a propo-
sitional logic built on a ﬁnite set of propositional atoms A. A
normative system N ⊆ L× L is a set of pairs of L, written as
N = {(a1, x1), (a2, x2), . . . , (an, xn)} and read as “if a1, then
it is obligatory that x1”, and so on. It may also be read as “if a1,
then it is forbidden that ¬x1”, etc.
The second principle of the input/output logic framework we
adopt in this paper is that the primary role of norms in a norma-
tive system is the derivation of obligations and prohibitions. Which
obligations and prohibitions can be derived from a normative sys-
tem depends on the factual situation, which we call the context or
input and represent by a propositional formula. Makinson and van
der Torre use a set of propositional formulas as input, but to sim-
plify the third principle in the following section, we assume that
the situation can be represented by a ﬁnite set of sentences, and
thus by their conjunction. The function that associates with each
context the set of obligations describes the meaning of the nor-
mative system, because it is a kind of ‘operational semantics’ of
the normative system. We put the term ‘operational semantics’ in
quotes, because this terminology is not used by Makinson and van
der Torre. We use this terminology, because we hope it clariﬁes
the notion of ‘implied norm’ in Deﬁnition 6 below. We represent
the set of derived obligations and prohibitions as a set of proposi-
tional formulas, because that is the simplest representation and it
facilitates the comparison with the AGM framework.
DEFINITION 2 (‘OPERATIONAL SEMANTICS’ [11]). An
input/output operation out : (2L×L)× L → 2L is a function from
the set of normative systems and contexts, to a set of sentences ofL.
We say that x is obligatory in normative system N and context a if
x ∈ out(N, a).
The following property expresses irrelevance of syntactic pre-
sentation.
DEFINITION 3 (IRRELEVANCE OF SYNTAX). out satisﬁes ir-
relevance of syntax if the following two properties hold.
IS1 If x ∈ out(N, a), a is logically equivalent to b in propositional
logic, and x is logically equivalent to y, then
y ∈ out(N, b).
IS2 If x ∈ out(N ∪ {(b, y)}, a), b is logically equivalent to c in
propositional logic, and y is logically equivalent to z, then
x ∈ out(N ∪ {(c, z)}, a).
The simplest input/output logic deﬁned by Makinson and van der
Torre is so-called simple-minded output.
DEFINITION 4 (SIMPLE-MINDED OUTPUT [11]). x is in the
simple-minded output ofN in context a, written as x ∈ out1(N, a),
if there is a set of norms (a1, x1), . . . , (an, xn) ∈ N such that
ai ∈ Cn(a) and x ∈ Cn(x1 ∧ . . . ∧ xn), where Cn(S) is the
consequence set of S in L.
In this paper we use the following running example on the wel-
fare policies of a virtual community on Second Life.
EXAMPLE 1. Let the normative system consist of two norms
N = {(poor, house), (old, healthins)}, stating that the community
has to give a house with low rent (house) to low income agents
(poor), and to provide free health insurance (healthins) to elderly
agents (old). Therefore we have that the community has to pro-
vide a house to someone with no income if no-income implies poor,
house ∈ out1(N, (no-income → poor) ∧ no-income), because
we have poor ∈ Cn((no-income → poor) ∧ no-income)) and
house ∈ Cn(house). Moreover, the obligations of the community
for low income elderly agents are all logical consequences of giv-
ing a house with low rent and providing a free health insurance,
because we have out1(N, poor ∧ old) = Cn(house ∧ healthins).
The operational semantics of a set of norms can be used to deﬁne
the two fundamental concepts of equivalence of normative systems,
and the redundancy of a norm in a normative system. For example,
since normative systems tend to grow quickly and become difﬁcult
to understand, redundancy is a useful notion to simplify normative
systems.
DEFINITION 5 (EQUIVALENCE AND REDUNDANCY).
Normative systems N and M are equivalent if and only if for all
propositional formulas a, we have that out(N, a) = out(M,a). A
norm (a, x) ∈ N is redundant in normative system N if and only
if N is equivalent to N \ {(a, x)}.
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2.3 ‘Implication’ among norms
The third principle we adopt from the input/output logic frame-
work is that we deﬁne a notion of ‘implication’ among rules – again
we write ‘implication’ in quotes, because Makinson and van der
Torre do not use this terminology. It is not deﬁned as a primi-
tive notion, but derived from the ‘operational semantics’ of the set
of norms, in the sense that a set of norms ‘implies’ another norm
(a, x) if and only if x is obligatory in context a. Likewise, we say
that 〈a, x〉 is implied if x is not obliged in context a. Note that this
corresponds to a weak permission of ¬x, which is derived from
regulative norms only, not from permissive norms (see [13] for a
discussion on this distinction).
DEFINITION 6 (NORM ‘IMPLICATION’ [11, 13]). Norm
(a, x) is ‘implied’ by normative system N , written as (a, x) ∈
out(N), if and only if x ∈ out(N, a), and 〈a, x〉 is ‘implied’ by
N , written as 〈a, x〉 ∈ out(N) if and only if x 
∈ out(N, a). If it
is clear from content which input/output logic out is used, then we
write also N for out(N).
Makinson and van der Torre use this new representation of norm
‘implication’, because it shortens the notation in the deﬁnitions of
the proof theory, as illustrated in the following example. In this
paper we use this notation to enable the use of AGM revision pos-
tulates to input/output logics. For example, with a notion of im-
plication deﬁned among rules, we can deﬁne a success postulate
on norm contraction by saying that the new set of norms does not
‘imply’ the contracted norm (see Section 3.4 for the formal details).
EXAMPLE 2. Strengthening of the Input or SI is represented by
out(N, a) ⊆ out(N, a ∧ b), which is equivalent to x ∈ out(N, a)
implies x ∈ out(N, a∧ b), and which therefore can be represented
by: if (a, x) ∈ out(N), then (a ∧ b, x) ∈ out(N). Visualized
as proof rules, this property can thus be represented either by the
following rule on the left using the ‘operational semantics’, or the
rule with the norm ‘implication’ on the right. If the set of norms N
does not change, then the two notations are equivalent.
x ∈ out(N, a)
x ∈ out(N, a ∧ b)SI
(a, x)
(a ∧ b, x)SI
Yet another way to represent this principle is the contrapositive: if
(a ∧ b, x) 
∈ out(N), then (a, x) 
∈ out(N), which can be repre-
sented by the following two equivalent representations of the Weak-
ening of the Input or WI proof rule. It may be seen as the inverse
of the Strengthening of the Input rule, and Makinson and van der
Torre therefore write also SI−1.
x 
∈ out(N, a ∧ b)
x 
∈ out(N, a) SI
−1 = WI
〈a ∧ b, x〉
〈a, x〉 SI
−1 = WI
Other properties can be represented as proof rules too. For exam-
ple, the ﬁrst item of irrelevance of syntax or IS1 in Deﬁnition 3 can
be represented as follows, where |= stands for logical implication
in propositional logic.
x ∈ out(N, a), |= a ↔ b, |= x ↔ y
y ∈ out(N, b) IS1
(a, x), |= a ↔ b, |= x ↔ y
(b, y)
IS1
Thus, to decide when a set of norms ‘implies’ another norm, we
resort to the ‘operational semantics’ of the norms.
2.4 Tarskian closure properties on norms
Makinson and van der Torre observe that the relation between
the ‘implication’ among rules (a, x) ∈ out(N) and the ‘opera-
tional semantics’ x ∈ out(N, a) has an analogy in classical logic,
where the pair a |= x is equivalent to the membership of x in the
consequence set of a, written as x ∈ Cn(a). However, it is impor-
tant to see that the notion of ‘implication’ should not be identiﬁed
with the notion of implication among conditionals in classical con-
ditional logic. This is illustrated by the Tarskian properties on the
closure operation on the input/output pairs. Whereas these prop-
erties hold by deﬁnition for a classical conditional logic, they rep-
resent non-trivial principles for a logic of rules. These additional
principles may either be accepted or rejected.
Reﬂexivity expresses that if the input is precisely the antecedent
of one of the norms, then the output contains the consequent of the
norm. Monotony expresses that the application of one rule cannot
block another rule, as in most rule based non-monotonic logics like,
for example, Reiter’s default logic. Idempotence expresses that if
we have x in the output of a, then we can add (a, x) as a rule
without changing the output.
DEFINITION 7 (CLOSURE). out is a closure operation when
the following three conditions hold.
Reﬂexivity x ∈ out(N ∪ {(a, x))}, a) (i.e., N ⊆ out(N)), if the
context is precisely the antecedent of one of the rules, then
the output contains the consequent of that rule.
Monotony x ∈ out(N1, a) implies x ∈ out(N1 ∪ N2, a) (i.e.,
out(N1) ⊆ out(N1 ∪ N2)), if the set of norms increases,
then no conclusions are lost.
Idempotence if x ∈ out(N, a), then for all b, we have out(N, b) =
out(N ∪ {(a, x)}, b) (i.e., out(N) = out(out((N))), if x is
obligatory in context a, then (a, x) can be added to the nor-
mative system without any consequence.
Makinson and van der Torre show that their seven input/output
logics satisfy the Tarskian properties, and their notion of ‘implica-
tion’ among norms is therefore a Tarskian consequence relation. In
this paper we consider only the ﬁrst three of their logics.
DEFINITION 8 ([11]). Let N(a) = {x | (a, x) ∈ N}, and
a complete formula v is a conjunction of a maxiconsistent set of
literals, or the conjunction of all literals ofL. Simple-minded, basic
and reusable output are deﬁned as follows.
out1(N, a) = Cn(N(Cn(a)))
out2(N, a) = ∩{out1(v) | a ∈ Cn(v), v complete}
out3(N, a) = ∩{out1(b) | a ∈ Cn(b), out1(b) ⊆ Cn(b)}
The following property illustrates the major properties of the
three logics, and implies that none of the logics satisﬁes identity
((a, a) for all a) or contraposition. Basic output handles reasoning
by cases, and reusable output handles iterated detachment. See [11]
for examples and additional properties.
PROPOSITION 1 ([11]). out1(N) is the minimal set that con-
tains N ∪ {(,)}, is closed under replacement of logical equiv-
alents in antecedent and consequent, and the following proof rules
strengthening of the input SI , weakening of the output WO, and
conjunction rule AND.
(a, x)
(a ∧ b, x)SI
(a, x ∧ y)
(a, x)
WO
(a, x), (a, y)
(a, x ∧ y) AND
out2 satisﬁes in addition the proof rule disjunction OR, and out3
the proof rule cumulative transitivity CT .
(a, x), (b, x)
(a ∨ b, x) OR
(a, x), (a ∧ x, y)
(a, y)
CT
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2.5 AGM theory and norm change
The AGM framework [2] for theory revision is the formal study
of how a set of propositions should change in view of a new in-
formation that may cause an inconsistency with the existing ones.
Expansion, revision and contraction are the three theory change
operations that Alchourrón, Gärdenfors and Makinson identiﬁed in
their AGM approach. The initial inspiration was a formal analysis
of the dynamics of a legal code. How can a norm be removed or
added to a code? What happens when the addition of a new law
conﬂicts with some of the existing ones?
They observed that these operations are more general and can be
deﬁned on any deductively closed set K of propositional formulas.
In particular, the expansion of K by a formula x is a set that accepts
the unproblematic x and it is denoted by K + x. A contraction
of K by x results in a set K − x from which x does not follow
anymore. Finally, the revision of K by x yields to a set K ∗ x
which contains x and from which parts of K that were conﬂicting
with x have been removed.
AGM theory is a well established formal theory. Here, we want
to take back its original inspiration and use AGM postulates for
norm change. Therefore, we deﬁne norm expansion, norm revi-
sion, and norm contraction. To generalize the AGM postulates for
our framework, we deﬁne a norm set as a set of norms closed un-
der an input/output logic, denoted by N . Since we do not want to
restrict ourselves to one particular logic, we use out to refer to any
input/output logic. We write N ⊕ (a, x) to indicate the expansion
of a normative system N by a new rule, N  (a, x) for the contrac-
tion of a norm (a, x) from N , and N  (a, x) for the revision of N
by the new norm (a, x).
Like AGM expansion, the deﬁnition of norm expansion is straight-
forward. The new norm that the legislator wants to enforce does
not cause any conﬂict with the existing legal code. Hence, (a, x) is
added to N together with all the norms that can be derived from the
union of N and (a, x) (similarly to theory revision, we assume N
to be closed under input/output logic): N⊕(a, x) = N ∪ {(a, x)}.
EXAMPLE 3. {(poor, house)} ⊕ (old, healthins) =
{(poor, house), (old, healthins)}
Theory contraction and revision are the more complex and inter-
esting types of change. The Levy and Harper identities highlight
that revision and contraction are interdeﬁnable. More speciﬁcally,
the Levy identity deﬁnes the revision of a set by x as the expan-
sion of the contracted set by ¬x. Because of the simplicity of this
deﬁnition, the contraction is often considered as the basic type of
change in revision. For this reason, we will also start from norm
contraction.
Does revision really offer a satisfactory framework for norm re-
vision? Some of the AGM axioms seem to be rational requirements
in a legal context, whereas they have been criticized when imposed
on theory change operators. An example is the success postulate,
requiring that a new input must always be accepted in the set. It
seems to be reasonable to impose such a requirement when we wish
to enforce a new norm or obligation. On the other hand, when we
consider a legal code as a set of conditional norms, the AGM princi-
ples prove to be too general to deal with the revision of a normative
system.
In order to have a closer look to these questions, we now need to
turn to the postulates for AGM theory contraction and revision and
to the corresponding norm contraction and revision.
3. NORM CONTRACTION
We start by reminding the AGM contraction postulates.
DEFINITION 9. Let K be a deductively closed set of proposi-
tional formulas. An AGM contraction operation − satisﬁes the fol-
lowing postulates.
K-1: K − x is a deductively closed set (closure or type)
K-2: K − x ⊆ K (inclusion or contraction)
K-3: If x 
∈ K then K = K − x (vacuity or min. action)
K-4: If 
 x then x 
∈ (K − x) (success)
K-5: If x ∈ K then K ⊆ (K − x) + x (recovery)
K-6: If  x ↔ y then K − x = K − y (extensionality)
K-7: ((K − x) ∩ (K − y)) ⊆ K − (x ∧ y) (min-conjunction)
K-8: If x 
∈ (K − (x ∧ y)) then K − (x ∧ y) ⊆ K − x (max-
conjunction)
The ﬁrst problem we encounter is that the last two postulates
refer to conjunctions, which are not deﬁned for norms. This is not
a major problem, since the ﬁrst six postulates of AGM theory are
known as the basic postulates, whereas the latter two are optional.
So we restrict ourselves to the basic postulates.
DEFINITION 10. Let out be an input/output logic. A norm con-
traction operator  satisﬁes the following postulates.
N-1: N  (a, x) is closed under out (closure or type)
N-2: N  (a, x) ⊆ N (inclusion or contraction)
N-3: If (a, x) 
∈ N then N = N  (a, x) (vacuity or min. action)
N-4: If (a, x) 
∈ out(∅) then (a, x) 
∈ N  (a, x) (success)
N-5: If (a, x) ∈ N then N ⊆ (N  (a, x))⊕ (a, x) (recovery)
N-6: If out({(a, x)}) = out({(b, y)}) then N  (a, x) =
N  (b, y) (extensionality)
In the remainder of this section, we are going to study these pos-
tulates. We approach them by translating the ‘implied norm’ repre-
sentation back to the ‘operational semantics’.
3.1 N-1: Closure
K-1: K − x is a deductively closed set (closure or type)
N-1: N  (a, x) is closed under out (closure or type)
The ﬁrst postulate for theory change requires that the result of
the contraction is a deductively closed set. Expansion, contraction
and revision operators are indeed deﬁned as functions from a de-
ductively closed set and a formula x to a new deductively closed
set.
The corresponding closure (type) postulate for norm contrac-
tion says that N  (a, x) is closed under out. In other words, if
(b, y) ∈ out(N  (a, x)), then (b, y) ∈ N  (a, x). Therefore, if
y ∈ out(N  (a, x), b), then (b, y) ∈ N  (a, x).
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N = N1 N2 N3 N4
{(poor, house ∧ healthins)} {(poor, healthins)} {(poor, healthins), {(poor, healthins),
(poor ∧ ¬old, house ∧ healthins)} (poor ∧ ¬old, house ∧ healthins),
(poor ∧ old ∧ young, house ∧ healthins)}
 Cn() Cn() Cn() Cn()
poor Cn(house ∧ healthins) Cn(healthins) Cn(healthins) Cn(healthins)
¬poor Cn() Cn() Cn() Cn()
poor ∨ old Cn() Cn() Cn() Cn()
poor ∧ old Cn(house ∧ healthins) Cn(healthins) Cn(healthins) Cn(healthins)
poor ∧ ¬old Cn(house ∧ healthins) Cn(healthins) Cn(house ∧ healthins) Cn(house ∧ healthins)
poor ∧ old ∧ young Cn(house ∧ healthins) Cn(healthins) Cn(healthins) Cn(house ∧ healthins)
. . .
Figure 1: Four alternatives for N  (poor ∧ old, house), N2, N3 and N4 satisfy the success postulate.
3.2 N-2: Inclusion
K-2: K − x ⊆ K (inclusion or contraction)
N-2: N  (a, x) ⊆ N (inclusion or contraction)
K-2 states that, because K − x is obtained from K by giving up
x, it is required that no new formulas occur in K − x.
The corresponding inclusion (contraction) postulate for norm
contraction says that N  (a, x) ⊆ N . Together with N-1, this
property says that if y ∈ out(N  (a, x), b), then y ∈ out(N, b).
In other words, for any context b, if something is obligatory after
norm contraction, then it was already obligatory before the contrac-
tion.
3.3 N-3: Vacuity
K-3: If x 
∈ K then K = K − x (vacuity or min. action)
N-3: If (a, x) 
∈ N then N = N  (a, x) (vacuity or min. action)
If x 
∈ K, the criterion of minimal change requires that nothing
is retracted from K.
The corresponding vacuity (min. action) postulate for norm con-
traction says that if (a, x) 
∈ N then N = N  (a, x). To-
gether with N-1, this property says that if x 
∈ out(N, a), then
N = N  (a, x). In other words, if we contract a norm (a, x), but




 x then x 
∈ (K − x) (success)
N-4: If (a, x) 
∈ out(∅) then (a, x) 
∈ N  (a, x) (success)
K-4 says that, unless x is logically valid (in which case it can
never be retracted), if we remove x from K, the resulting set will
not contain x.
The corresponding success postulate for norm contraction says
that if (a, x) 
∈ out(∅) then (a, x) 
∈ N  (a, x). In other words, if
x 
∈ out(∅, a), then x 
∈ out(N(a, x), a). The following example
illustrates the success postulate.
EXAMPLE 4. Assume out1, N = {(poor, house ∧ healthins)}
and four possible normative systems N  (poor ∧ old, house) vi-
sualized in Figure 1. This ﬁgure must be read as follows. Each
column represent one possible way in which (poor ∧ old, house)
can be contracted from N . The short notation in on top, and the
output of the set of norms for each input on the left is written below
it.
The success condition says that house 
∈ out(N ′, poor ∧ old),
which is not satisﬁed by N1, but it is satisﬁed by N2, N3 and N4.
Thus, there are several ways in which a set of norms can be con-
tracted. The purpose of the postulates is precisely to distinguish the
admissible solutions from the inadmissible ones.
However, unlike in AGM theory revision, the question here is not
only what and how much to contract, but also for which inputs to
contract. This is what distinguishes the different solutions in the
example. All the possible Ni prescribe that a free health insurance
must be given to the poor. Independently of whether the input is
the poor people only, or the poor and old or, again, the poor and
the not old, we obtain the same Ni. Hence, in order to obtain a
normative system that performs a contraction for all poor people
(also the not old ones), Ni should contain an additional norm as in
N3 and N4.
PROPOSITION 2. Logical consequences of the success criterion
for out1, out2 and out3 are the inverses of proof rules given in Def-
inition 8.
PROOF. Follows from [13, Observation 3], which says that the
non-repetition property holds for:
• out1 with TAUT, SI, WO, AND
• out2 with TAUT, SI, WO, AND, OR
• out3 with TAUT, SI, WO, CTA
where CTA derives (a, x ∧ y) from (a, x) and (a ∧ x, y).
3.5 N-5: Recovery
K-5: If x ∈ K then K ⊆ (K − x) + x (recovery)
N-5: If (a, x) ∈ N then N ⊆ (N  (a, x))⊕ (a, x) (recovery)
K-5 requires that expanding K − x by x should give the same
set as before the contraction, that is K.
The corresponding recovery postulate for norm contraction says
that, if (a, x) ∈ N , thenN ⊆ (N(a, x))⊕(a, x). In other words,
contracting a normative system by (a, x) and then expanding by the
same (a, x) should leave N unchanged.
EXAMPLE 5. Assume N = {(poor, house ∧ healthins),
(old, house ∧ healthins)} and N ′ = N  (poor, house). Sup-
pose that N
′
is calculated by the obviously too strong principle
that house is contracted from the consequent of each rule, such that
N
′
= out({(poor, healthins), (old, healthins)}). This does not sat-
isfy recovery since for all reasonable input/output logics, adding
(poor, house) to N
′
does not give us N again.
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N N1 = N  (poor ∧ old, house) N2 = N1 ⊕ (poor ∧ old, house)
{(poor, house)} {(poor ∧ ¬old, house), {(poor ∧ ¬old, house),
(poor ∧ old ∧ young, house)} (poor ∧ old ∧ young, house),
(poor ∧ old, house)}
 Cn() Cn() Cn()
poor Cn(house) Cn() Cn()
¬poor Cn() Cn() Cn()
poor ∨ old Cn() Cn() Cn()
poor ∧ old Cn(house) Cn() Cn(house)
poor ∧ ¬old Cn(house) Cn(house) Cn(house)
poor ∧ old ∧ young Cn(house) Cn(house) Cn(house)
. . .
Figure 2: Recovery. (N  (poor ∧ old, house))⊕ (poor ∧ old, house).
The following result shows that, surprisingly, the ﬁve postulates
considered thus far are consistent only for some input/output logics,
but not for others. In particular, if we adopt out1 or out3 then there
is no single norm contraction operator satisfying the postulates.
PROPOSITION 3. N-1 until N-5 cannot hold together for out1
or out3, but they can hold together for out2.
PROOF. (sketch) A counterexample for out1 and out3 is
(poor, house) /∈ ({(poor, house)}  (poor ∧ old, house)) ⊕
(poor∧old, house). (poor, house) is not part of {(poor, house)}
 (poor ∧ old, house), and there is no way to derive it when
(poor ∧ old, house) is added again. The same counterexample
also works for out3. It is visualized in Figure 2.
An operator for out2 can be deﬁned as follows. From Deﬁni-
tion 8 it follows directly that the output is determined by complete
formulas. Assume we contract (a, x). Let V be a complete formula
implying a, and contract x from out(N,V ) using a belief revision
contraction.
3.6 N-6: Extensionality
K-6: If  x ↔ y then K − x = K − y (extensionality)
N-6: If out({(a, x)}) = out({(b, y)}) then N  (a, x) =
N  (b, y) (extensionality)
It is the content of x rather than its particular linguistic formu-
lation that determines the contraction of K by x. This means that
logically equivalent sentences should lead to identical revisions.
The extensionality postulate for norm contraction says that if
out({(a, x)}) = out({(b, y)}) then N  (a, x) = N  (b, y). In
other words, if for all c, we have out({(a, x)}, c) = out({(b, y)}, c),
then we have for all c: out({(a, x)}  (b, y), c) = out({(b, y)} 
(b, y), c).
4. NORM REVISION
In this section we discuss norm revision. We start by recalling
the AGM postulates for revision, and we then introduce the cor-
responding postulates for norm revision. Possible deﬁnitions of a
coherent normative system conclude the section.
4.1 Postulates for norm revision
DEFINITION 11. Let K be a deductively closed set. An AGM
revision operation ∗ satisﬁes the following postulates.
K ∗ 1: K ∗ x is a deductively closed set (closure or type)
K ∗ 2: x ∈ (K ∗ x) (success)
K ∗ 3: K ∗ x ⊆ K + x (inclusion)
K ∗ 4: If ¬x /∈ K then K + x = K ∗ x (vacuity)
K ∗ 5: K ∗ x = K⊥ iff  ¬x (triviality)
K ∗ 6: If  x ↔ y then K ∗ x = K ∗ y (extensionality)
K ∗ 7: K ∗ (x ∧ y) ⊆ (K ∗ x) + y (iterated K∗ 3)
K ∗ 8: If ¬y /∈ K ∗ x then (K ∗ x) + y ⊆ K ∗ (x ∧ y) (iterated
K ∗ 4)
The same argument as for contraction applies to the last two re-
vision postulates. Hence, we restrict ourselves to the ﬁrst six pos-
tulates. The corresponding postulates for norm revision are the fol-
lowing.
DEFINITION 12. Let out be an input/output logic, and N a set
of norms closed under out: A norm revision operator  satisﬁes
the following postulates.
N  1: N  (a, x) is closed under out (closure or type)
N  2: (a, x) ∈ (N  (a, x)) (success)
N  3: N  (a, x) ⊆ N ⊕ (a, x) (inclusion)
N  4: If ¬(a, x) /∈ N then N ⊕ (a, x) = N  (a, x) (vacuity)
N  5: N  (a, x) = N⊥ iff ¬(a, x) ∈ out(∅) (triviality)
N  6: If out({(a, x)}) = out({(b, y)}) then N  (a, x) =
N  (b, y) (extensionality)
Closure, success and extensionality state for revision the homony-
mous conditions we have seen for theory and norm contraction.
N  3 and N  4 deﬁne the relation between revision and expan-
sion: When ¬(a, x) /∈ N , revision and expansion coincide, i.e.
N  (a, x) = N ⊕ (a, x). More generally, the result of revising
N by (a, x) should contain the new norm together with all those
norms that have not been excluded from N in order to accommo-
date (a, x), hence N  (a, x) should be a subset of N ⊕ (a, x), as
the inclusion condition states. Finally, N  5 says that the revision
of a normative system should be coherent if the new norm is not
contradictory.
However, ¬(a, x) and N⊥ are not deﬁned in input/output logic
thus far. Since revision is the type of change that occurs when a
new information conﬂicts with the existing ones, we now have to
turn to investigate what it means that a norm ‘conﬂicts’ with a set
of existing ones.
Guido Boella, Gabriella Pigozzi, Leendert van der Torre • Normative Framework for Normative System Change
175
4.2 Coherent normative systems
Theory revision postulates prescribe how a deductively closed
set of formulas should change when the addition of a new formula
causes an inconsistency to the initial set. Similarly, a legislator
who wishes to add a new norm to a normative system N , and the
addition conﬂicts with N , needs to make some changes to N in
order to accommodate the new norm.
As norms do not bear truth values, we cannot, in any usual sense,
say that a normative system is inconsistent. All we can consider
is the consistency of the output of a set of norms. As in [9], we
like to use the term coherence with respect to a set of norms with
consistent output. However, when a normative system can be said
to be coherent is not a trivial question, as the following tentative
deﬁnitions show. The ﬁrst proposal is to say that N is coherent if
no inconsistent output can be derived:
(1) A normative system N is coherent iff ⊥ /∈ out(N, a).
However, one might argue that one should be able to determine
whether a set of norms N is coherent or not regardless of what
arbitrary facts a might be assumed. A better deﬁnition would be:
(1a) A normative system N is coherent iff there exists a context a
such that ⊥ /∈ out(N, a).
For (1a) it sufﬁces that there exists a situation in which the
norms can be, or could have been, fulﬁlled. However, consider the
set of norms N = {(poor, house), (poor,¬house)} that requires
both house and ¬house to be realized in condition poor. If we de-
note by out any of the output operations out1, out2, out3, we can
say that ⊥ /∈ out(N,¬poor): no conﬂicting demands arise when
¬poor is factually assumed. Yet something seems wrong with a
normative system that explicitly considers a fact only to tie to it
conﬂicting normative consequences. The dual of (1a) would be:
(1b) A normative system N is coherent iff for all contexts a,
⊥ /∈ out(N, a).
Now a set N = {(poor, house), (poor,¬house)} would no
longer be termed coherent. However, we cannot be satisﬁed with
this deﬁnition as (1b) makes the claim that for no situation a, two
norms (poor, house), (old, house) would ever come into conﬂict,
which might seem too strong. We may wish to restrict a to con-
texts that are consistent, or that are not in violation of the norms.
The question is, basically, how to distinguish situations that the
norm-givers should have taken care of, from those that describe
misfortune of otherwise unhappy circumstances. A weaker claim
than (1b) would be:
(1c) A normative system N is coherent iff for all a with
(a, x) ∈ N , ⊥ /∈ out(N, a).
By this change, consistency of output is required just for those
factual situations that the norm-givers have foreseen, in the sense
that they have explicitly tied normative consequences to such facts.
Still, (1c) might require further modiﬁcation, since if poor is a
foreseen situation, and so is house, then also poor ∨ house or
poor ∧ house might be counted as foreseen situations for which
the norms should be coherent.
However, there is a further difﬁculty: let N contain a norm
(poor,¬poor) that, for conditions in which poor is unalterably
true, demands that ¬poor be realized. For the principal output
operations out, we then have ¬poor ∈ out(N, poor), but not
⊥ ∈ out(N, poor). Certainly the term ‘incoherent’ should apply
to a normative system that requires the agent to accomplish what
is — given the facts in which the duty arises — impossible. But
since the input is not necessarily included in the output for all out-
put operations, neither (1) nor its variants implies that the agent can
actually realize all propositions in the output, though they might be
logically consistent. We might therefore demand that the output is
not consistent simpliciter, but consistent with the input:
(2) A normative system N is coherent iff ⊥ /∈ out(N, a) ∪ {a}.
But with deﬁnition (2) we obtain the questionable result that for
any case of norm-violation, i.e. for any case in which (poor, house)
∈ N and (poor∧¬house) ∈ Cn(a), N must be termed incoherent
– Adam’s fall would only indicate that there was something wrong
with God’s commands. One remedy would be to leave aside all
those norms that are invariably violated, i.e. instead of out(N, a)
take out({(poor, house) ∈ N | (poor ∧ ¬house) /∈ Cn(a)}, a)
– but then a set N such that (poor,¬poor) ∈ N would not be
incoherent.
As can be seen from the discussion above, input/output logic
provides the tools to formally discuss this question, by rephrasing
the question of coherence of the norms as one of consistency of
output, and of output with input. Both notions have been explored
in the input/output framework as ‘output under constraints’ [12]:
Deﬁnition (Output under constraints) Let N be a set of con-
ditional norms and C a set of propositional formulas. Then N is
coherent in a under constraintsC when out(N, a)∪C is consistent.
Future study must deﬁne an output operation, determine the rel-
evant contexts a, and ﬁnd the constraints C, such that any set of
norms N would be appropriately termed coherent or incoherent by
this deﬁnition.
5. RELATED WORK
The use of norms in multiagent systems allows to regulate the
behavior of the agents. However, agents may possess conﬂicting or
incoherent norms. A way to detect and resolve conﬂicts is proposed
in [16], where norms are speciﬁc to the agents and agents can adopt
roles as in [15].
In this paper we take AGM theory change as a framework to
evaluate the change of a normative system. The ﬁrst work on the
logic of the revision of a set of norms goes back to Bulygin and Al-
chourrón [1], and to Alchourrón and Makinson [3]. There, a legal
code is taken to be a set of propositions together with their logical
consequences. In other words, a norm x is taken to be simply a
formula in propositional logic.
Although the amendment and the derogation of a legal code were
the initial motivation in Alchourrón and Makinson’ research on the-
ory change, they considered a very general framework. Here we
claimed that an appropriate account of norm change should be able
to represent conditional norms, as in the input/output framework.
So far, however, little attention has been paid on how the formal-
ization of changes occurring in legal systems.
In [14] Maranhão focuses on the relation between belief revision
and the jurisdictional activity. The AGM success postulate is criti-
cized. Instead of accepting the new formula and removing some of
the existing beliefs in the set, he deﬁnes a new operation, called re-
ﬁnement. According to reﬁnement, the agent modiﬁes his belief set
by accepting the new sentence under certain condition. Formally,
the reﬁnement of K by a is the partial meet revision K ∗ (b → a).
The reﬁnement operator is an attempt to capture the process in the
legal practice in which a judge has to assess a case that presents a
condition that was not foreseen by the legislator.
Governatori and Di Gusto [7] consider ﬁnite base revision (the
revision of not deductively closed sets) where facts are distinguished
from rules. They study a procedure which deﬁnes the revision of
a base by a new fact as a change of the rules part of the base: new
rules are found in order to accommodate the new information.
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6. SUMMARY AND OUTLOOK
Norm change allows not only to adapt multiagent systems to the
new situation, but also agents to simplify normative systems by rec-
ognizing and removing redundant ones. Given the current devel-
opment of norm change methods in multiagent systems, we need
a normative framework to evaluate and classify normative system
change. Since the AGM theory has been developed as such a frame-
work, we start from there, and to represent the rule based character
of norms, we introduce various ideas from the input/output logic
approach. Within this framework, we identify the principle to rep-
resent norms by pairs of formulas, the ‘operational semantics’ of a
set of norms to derive obligations, prohibitions and weak permis-
sions, and the notion of ‘implication’ between norms, indirectly
deﬁned in terms of the operational semantics.
In the tradition of theory change, we taken contraction to be the
more elementary kind of change. We show that the basic postulates
can easily carry over to the norm case, but the two additional pos-
tulates do not seem to have a straightforward counterpart in norm
change. We illustrate that the success postulate may be interpreted
as a set of success conditions on outputs. Then we show the surpris-
ing result that for two common systems for norms, called simple-
minded and reusable output, the postulates do not allow for any
norm change operation. On the positive side, we show that norm
change operations exist for basic output. We also show that the
proof theory of norm change is closely related to the proof theory
of permissions from an input/output perspective.
Finally we consider norm revision, where we only give a partial
answer to the question how norm revision methods can be classi-
ﬁed. The translation of the AGM postulates is much more difﬁcult
than for the contraction case, because we have to deﬁne when a set
of norms is “consistent”, which in the area of normative systems is
usually called coherent. We therefore introduce and discuss vari-
ous notions of coherence in this setting. We leave to future work
to investigate whether norm contraction and norm revision can be
inter-deﬁned as in the theory revision and contraction case.
Other topics of further research are an extension of the proposed
framework with permissive and constitutive norms, and the study of
norms under constraints, for example to represent contrary-to-duty
reasoning, dilemmas and hierarchical normative systems. Existing
developments of the input/ouput logic framework can be applied
here directly. Moreover, when proposals of norm change methods
are presented in a detailed way, the framework will be applied to
study these methods.
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